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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Samuel Glenn appeals from the judgment entered upon his conditional 
guilty plea to felony driving under the influence. Glen challenges the district 
court's denial of his motion to dismiss, contending his driving under the influence 
charge could not be enhanced to a felony based upon a prior charge that was 
dismissed pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
Glenn was arrested and issued a citation for driving under the influence. 
(R., p.6.) The state subsequently filed an Amended Complaint charging Glenn 
with felony driving under the influence based on a prior conviction for felony 
driving under the influence "within the previous fifteen years." (R., pp.9-10.) The 
state also charged Glenn with possession of an open container in a motor 
vehicle. (R., pp.9-10.) Glenn waived his preliminary hearing and was bound 
over to district court on both charges. (R., pp.32-36.) 
After being bound over, Glenn filed a motion to dismiss asserting 
dismissal was required because the prior felony used to enhance his current 
charge to a felony was "withdrawn and Judge Horton issued an Order Dismissing 
that Withheld Judgment." (R., p.43.) Attached to Glenn's motion was the Order 
of Dismissal Pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604 entered on March 22, 2007, in Ada 
County Case No. H0100022.1 (R., pp.45-46.) That Order states, in relevant part: 
1 Although the state's charging documents do not set forth the details of the prior 
felony conviction used to enhance the charge in this case (R., pp.9-10, 33-36), it 
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"[T]he Court determines that defendant's guilty plea shall be, and hereby is, set 
aside and this action is finally dismissed and the defendant discharged." (R., 
p.46.) The state filed a brief in opposition to Glenn's motion, asserting the motion 
should be denied for three reasons: (1) the motion was untimely under I.C.R. 
12(d); (2) Glenn failed to file a separate memorandum in support of the motion as 
required by Local Rule 8.1; and (3) Glenn failed to explain why his request for 
dismissal was not foreclosed by the Court of Appeals' recent opinion in State v. 
Reed, 149 Idaho 901,243 P.3d 1089 (Ct. App. 2010). (R., pp.67-69.) 
The court held a hearing on Glenn's motion to dismiss (5/27/2011 Tr.), 
after which it entered a written Memorandum Decision and Order (R., pp.76-80). 
With respect to the state's request that the court deny the motion as untimely, the 
court stated: "The Court in its discretion, pursuant to I.C.R. 12(d), determines 
that Defendant's motion, although not timely, should nonetheless be addressed 
on its merits and therefore relieves Defendant of his failure to comply with this 
rule."2 (R., p.77.) The court instead addressed the merits of Glenn's motion and, 
relying on Reed, denied Glenn's motion. (R., pp.76-78.) Glenn thereafter 
entered a conditional guilty plea to felony driving under the influence, reserving 
his right to challenge the denial of his motion to dismiss. (R., pp.85-91; see 
appears undisputed that the relevant charge was the felony driving under the 
influence charge adjudicated in Ada County Case No. H0100022. In that case, 
judgment was entered on August 8, 2001, at which time the Court suspended 
Glenn's sentence and placed him on probation for five years. (See R., p.76.) 
Glenn's probation was later terminated on July 24, 2004. (Id.) 
2 The court also rejected the state's request to deny relief based on Glenn's 
alleged failure to file a supporting memorandum since, as the district court noted, 
Glenn filed such a memorandum on May 6, 2011. (R., pp.49-61, 77.) 
2 
generally 6/10/2011 Tr.) The court imposed a unified ten-year sentence with 
three years fixed, but retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.104-107.) Glenn filed a timely 
notice of appeal. (R., pp.116-118.) 
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ISSUE 
Glenn states the issue on appeal as: 
Whether State v. Reed, 149 Idaho 901 (Ct. App. 2010), should be 
overruled, such that it was error to allow the State to enhance Mr. 
Glenn's sentence for driving under the influence because he has 
"pled guilty or has been found guilty of a felony violation of [the 
relevant code sections], notwithstanding the form of the 
judgment(s) or withheld judgment(s) ... within fifteen (15) years" 
where the necessary prior convictions [sic] no longer exists as the 
prior guilty plea had been withdrawn and the case dismissed. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 6.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Should the Court affirm the denial of Glenn's motion to dismiss on the 
grounds that it was untimely and Glenn failed to show good cause or excusable 
neglect to excuse the untimely filing? Alternatively, given Glenn's 
acknowledgment that controlling precedent forecloses his argument and his lack 
of any reasoned justification for overruling that precedent, has Glenn failed to 




Because Glenn Failed To Establish Good Cause For His Failure To Comply With 
The Filing Requirements Of LC.R. 12(d), He Was Not Entitled To Consideration 
Of The Merits Of His Motion And His Motion Should Have Been Denied As 
Untimely 
A. Introduction 
Although the district court "relieve[d] [Glenn] of his failure to comply with" 
the filing requirements of I.C.R. 12(d), Glenn never offered a reason for his failure 
to do so and the district court did not find good cause or excusable neglect that 
would warrant consideration of Glenn's untimely motion. (R., p.77.) This Court 
should therefore affirm the denial of Glenn's motion to dismiss on the ground that 
the motion was untimely. 
B. Glenn's Motion Should Have Been Denied As Untimely 
Motions to dismiss filed pursuant to I.C.R. 12(b) "must be filed within 
twenty-eight (28) days after the entry of a plea of not guilty or seven (7) days 
before trial whichever is earlier." LC.R. 12(d). Glenn pled not guilty on February 
11, 2011, and his trial was set for June 20, 2011. (R., pp~3, 40-41.) Pursuant to 
LC.R. 12(d), Glenn's motion to dismiss was due no later than March 11, 2011, 
which was the earlier of the two dates contemplated by I.C.R. 12(d). Glenn did 
not, however, file his motion until April 26, 2011, more than one month after the 
time for filing the motion expired. 
Although LC.R. 12(d) allows the district court to shorten or enlarge the 
time for filing a Rule 12 motion, in exercising that discretion, the court must find 
that the defendant has shown good cause or excusable neglect. I.C.R. 12(d). 
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Glenn showed neither. Indeed, the state can find nothing in the record, either in 
writing or at the hearing on the motion to dismiss, where Glenn responded to the 
state's assertion that the motion should be denied as untimely, much less offered 
any basis for finding good cause or excusable neglect. (See generally R; 
5/27/2011 Tr.) Rather, it appears from the district court's Memorandum Decision 
and Order that the court simply concluded that the motion should "be addressed 
on its merits" even though it was untimely. (R, p.77.) This conclusion 
constitutes an abuse of discretion. State v. Dice, 126 Idaho 595, 887 P.2d 1102 
(Ct. App. 1994), is on point. 
In Dice, the defendant filed a suppression motion, which the state objected 
to as untimely. 126 Idaho at 597, 887 P.3d at 1104. The district court 
considered the motion anyway, citing the "interest[s] of justice," and did not 
require Dice, or give him the opportunity to, "offer any good cause for the delay 
or to show that the lateness was due to excusable neglect." ~ Instead, "[i]t 
appear[ed] the district court decided to hear the motion because it felt the motion 
was meritorious." ~ The Court of Appeals concluded this "was error," 
reasoning: 
Idaho Criminal Rule 12(d) clearly requires either good cause or 
excusable neglect to be shown by a party who has missed the 
prescribed deadlines. Allowing untimely motions to be heard 
because they appear meritorious eviscerates the purpose of the 
rule. The district court should have entertained an explanation by 
Dice's counsel for the delay and then should have determined 
whether good cause or excusable neglect was shown based on the 
reasons given. If no good cause or excusable neglect was 
established to the satisfaction of the district court, the motion 
should not have been heard. 
Dice, 126 Idaho at 597, 887 P.2d at 1104. 
6 
As in Dice, Glenn never even offered an explanation for the delay that 
could have formed the basis of a finding of good cause or excusable neglect, and 
the court did not purport to find either, but considered the motion regardless for 
some unstated reason. (R., p.77.) The district court's decision to "relieve[ ] 
[Glenn] of his failure to comply with th[e] rule" under these circumstances was an 
abuse of discretion. Dice, supra; see also State v. Alanis, 109 Idaho 884, 888, 
712 P.2d 585, 589 (1985) ("A court may not arbitrarily enlarge or shorten the 
filing requirements of the rule."). The denial of Glenn's motion to dismiss should 
be affirmed on this basis. See,~, State v. Avelar, 129 Idaho 700, 704, 931 
P.2d 1218, 1222 (1997) (where the lower court reaches the correct result by a 
different theory, the appellate court will affirm the order on the correct theory). 
II. 
Even If This Court Considers The Merits Of Glenn's Motion To Dismiss, Glenn 
Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Denying The Motion Given 
The Controlling Holding In Reed, Which Glenn Has Not Shown To Be Manifestly 
Wrong, Unwise, Unjust. Or Contrary To Any Idaho Supreme Court Precedent 
A. Introduction 
Glenn contends that although "the district court and counsel below were 
correct that Reed was not only on-point, but had similar facts to [his] case," 
reliance on that decision was nevertheless "error" because, he argues, "the Court 
of Appeals' decision in Reed is in direct conflict with several recent decisions 
from the Idaho Supreme Court, including, but not limited to, Sharp, Parkinson, 
Robinson, and Manners." (Appellant's Brief, p.6.) Glenn also contends "the 
Court of Appeals' effort at statutory interpretation in Reed was unnecessary, for 
the reasons set forth by the Idaho Supreme Court in Verska." (Id.) Glenn's 
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assertion that the district court erred by relying on binding precedent is without 
merit. As to his request that this Court overrule Reed, he has failed to offer any 
reasoned basis for doing so. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Idaho jurisprudence requires respect for its own precedent. The rule of 
stare decisis dictates that controlling precedent be followed "unless it is 
manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or unless 
overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy 
continued injustice." State v. Dana, 137 Idaho 6, 9, 43 P.3d 765, 768 (2002); 
State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 660, 8 P.3d 652, 655 (2000) (quoting 
Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72,77,803 P.2d 978, 983 (1990)); 
see also State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 1001, 842 P.2d 660, 680 (1992) 
("[P]rior decisions of this Court should govern unless they are manifestly wrong 
or have proven over time to be unjust or unwise."); State v. Odiaga, 125 Idaho 
384, 388, 871 P.2d 801, 805 (1994) ("Having previously decided this question, 
and being presented with no new basis upon which to consider the issue, [the 
Court is] guided by the principle of stare decisis to adhere to the law as 
expressed in [its] earlier opinions."); State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 440-52, 825 
P.2d 1081, 1096-1108 (1991) (McDevitt, J., specially concurring). 
The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law 
over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Thompson, 140 
Idaho 796,798, 102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004); State v. Dorn, 140 Idaho 404,405, 
94 P.3d 709, 710 (Ct. App. 2004). 
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C. Glenn Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Motion To Dismiss 
The state charged Glenn with felony driving under the influence pursuant 
to I.C. Idaho Code §§ 18-8004 and 18-8005(9). Section 18-8005(9) reads, in 
relevant part: 
[A]ny person who has pled guilty or has been found guilty of a 
felony violation of the provisions of section 18-8004, Idaho 
Code, a felony violation of the provisions of section 18-8004C, 
Idaho Code, a violation of the provisions of 18-8006, Idaho 
Code, a violation of the provisions of section 18-4006 3.(b), 
Idaho Code, notwithstanding the form of the judgment(s) or 
withheld judgment(s) or any substantially conforming foreign 
criminal felony violation, notwithstanding the form of the 
judgment(s) or withheld judgment(s), and within fifteen (15) years 
pleads guilty or is found guilty of a further violation of the 
provisions of section 18-8004, Idaho Code, shall be guilty of a 
felony and shall be sentenced pursuant to subsection (6) of 
this section. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Glenn moved for dismissal on the grounds that his prior felony DUI could 
not be used to enhance his current DUI because the prior felony was ultimately 
dismissed pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604. (R., pp.43, 49-61.) Glenn, however, 
acknowledges, as he must, that the Court of Appeals' recent opinion in Reed, 
supra, is dispositive of his argument. (Appellant's Brief, p.6.) In Reed, the Court 
of Appeals addressed an identical argument in relation to the same type of felony 
enhancement found in I.C. § 18-8005(6). 149 Idaho at 902, 243 P.3d at 1090. 
The Court framed the issue as follows: "whether a guilty plea that has been 
dismissed under I.C. § 19-2604(1) can be used for enhancement purposes under 
I.C. § 18-8005(6)." lit The Court held that it could. lit at 904,243 P.3d at 1092. 
Thus, Glenn's claim that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss 
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as required by Reed is without merit. State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 986, 842 
P.2d 660, 665 (Idaho 1992) (recognizing decisions issued by the Court of 
Appeals are "precedential law of this state, and all tribunals inferior to the Court 
of Appeals are obligated to abide by decisions issued by the Court of Appeals"). 
This Court should also reject Glenn's request to overrule Reed as he has 
failed to demonstrate Reed is manifestly wrong, unjust or unwise, nor has he 
established overruling Reed is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of 
law and remedy continued injustice. Glenn contends otherwise, arguing Reed is 
in "direct conflict" with the Idaho Supreme Court's opinions in United States v. 
Sharp, 145 Idaho 403, 179 P.3d 1059 (2008), State v. Parkinson, 144 Idaho 825, 
172 P.3d 1100 (2007), State v. Robinson, 143 Idaho 306, 142 P.3d 729 (2006), 
and Manners v. State, Bd. of Veterinary Medicine, 107 Idaho 950,694 P.2d 1298 
(1985). (Appellant's Brief, p.6.) Glenn further contends "the Court of Appeals' 
effort at statutory interpretation in Reed was unnecessary, for the reasons set 
forth by the Idaho Supreme Court in Versk8." (Appellant's Brief, p.6.) According 
to Glenn these "significant shortcomings" justify overruling Reed. (Appellant's 
Brief, p.6.) A review of the cases upon which Glenn relies and consideration of 
accepted principles of statutory construction shows Reed was correctly decided 
and should not be overruled. 
Glenn claims Reed is inconsistent with the "fundamental rule" he contends 
was "established" in Manners that a "conviction which is vacated [pursuant to I.C. 
§ 19-2604] becomes non-existent in the history of the case and is to be treated 
as if it had never existed at aiL" (Appellant's Brief, p.8.) While the Court in 
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Manners undoubtedly stated that Manners' "conviction [ ] was erased when the 
judge ... dismissed the charge against him pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604," 107 
Idaho at 952, 694 P.2d at 1300, Glenn's claim that Manners established a 
"fundamental rule" that relief under I.C. § 19-2604 "erase[s]" a conviction for all 
purposes is contradicted by opinions issued post-Manners. The Supreme 
Court's opinion in Robinson, 143 Idaho 306, 142 P.3d 729, is illustrative. 
In Robinson, the defendant pled guilty to an offense that subjected him to 
the sex offender registration act. 143 Idaho at 307, 142 P.3d at 730. Robinson 
was placed on probation and, upon completion of his probation, he "filed an 
application to have his guilty plea set aside and his case dismissed pursuant to 
I.C. § 19-2604(1). which was granted." 1.9.:. Robinson subsequently "filed a 
motion to be released from the sex offender registry and to have his name 
expunged from the central registry," which the district court denied. 1.9.:. On 
appeal, the Court addressed "whether the leniency afforded [Robinson] under 
I.C. § 19-2604(1) [took] him out of the purview of the registration act or whether" 
he instead had to meet the "requirements for release and expungement set out 
by our legislature in I.C. § 18-8310." 1.9.:. 
In claiming he could not be required to register after being given relief 
under I.C. § 19-2604(1), Robinson relied on Manners for the proposition that he 
could "no longer be considered a person who pleaded guilty to an enumerated 
offense." Robinson, 143 Idaho at 309, 142 P.3d at 732. The Court rejected 
Robinson's argument, concluding "Manners does not dictate the result Robinson 
suggests." 1.9.:. The Court held: 
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Manners stands only for the proposition that I.C. § 19-2604(1) 
provides prospective relief, not retrospective relief. Idaho Code § 
19-2604(1) can restore to a defendant his civil rights, but it cannot 
act, in this instance, to remove the statutory consequences of 
committing a sexual offense. Such removal would require a 
retrospective application of I.C. § 19-2604(1), in contradiction of 
Manners. Once Robinson came within the purview of the 
registration act by virtue of pleading guilty to I.C. 18-6008, the 
leniency shown him under I.C. 19-2604(1) could not change that 
status. The record-cleansing effects of I.C. 19-2604(1) works only 
to remove from consideration a felony conviction once leniency has 
been granted; it cannot reach back in time to remove Robinson 
from the application of the registration act. 
Robinson, 143 Idaho at 309, 142 P.3d at 732. The Court also noted that, in 
Manners, it "accepted the proposition that the effects of I.C. § 19-2604 could be 
overridden by another statute." kL at 310, 142 P.3d at 733. The Court further 
explained: 
[S]ince I.C. § 19-2604(1) is a legislative creation the leniency it 
affords offenders may be limited by other legislative acts. It is 
presumed that the legislature knew that guilty pleas could be 
withdrawn and charges dismissed under I.C. § 19-2604(1). Yet, the 
legislature did not specifically create an exception to the registration 
requirement for those who obtain such leniency when it easily could 
have written such an exception into the registration act. Instead, 
the legislature specifically made the registration act applicable to 
anyone who has a conviction for an enumerated offense and 
defined conviction as including anyone who has been adjudicated 
guilty of an enumerated sex offense notwithstanding the form of the 
judgment or withheld judgment. By adopting this definition of 
conviction and mandating that anyone convicted of an enumerated 
offense meet the requirements of I.C. § 18-8310 in order to be 
released from the registration requirements, the legislature made it 
clear that I.C. § 18-8310 is the only mechanism by which a sex 
offender can receive relief from the requirements of the registration 
act. 
Robinson, 143 Idaho at 310, 142 P.3d at 733 (citations omitted). 
Similarly, the Supreme Court in Parkinson rejected the notion that relief 
pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604(1) erases a conviction for all purposes. 144 Idaho at 
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828, 172 P.3d at 1103. The Court expressly stated "[a] conviction is not entirely 
erased" whenever relief is granted under I.C. § 19-2604(1). kL. (emphasis 
added). Thus, for example, although "the statute dictates that a dismissed 
conviction cannot be used to deny the defendant's civil rights," it "does not 
provide authority to take further actions, such as eliminating each and every 
reference to the case in an official record." kL. 
Contrary to Glenn's claim, the Court of Appeals' opinion in Reed is entirely 
consistent with Robinson and Parkinson. Indeed, the Court of Appeals cited both 
cases in reaching its conclusion in Reed. 149 Idaho at 903, 243 P.3d at 1091. 
Reed applies what was recognized in Robinson and Parkinson - the effect of 
relief awarded pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604(1) is not without limits and is subject to 
other legislative enactments. The other legislative enactment limiting its effect in 
Glenn's case is, similar to Reed, the enhancement provisions of I.C. § 18-
8005(9). Like I.C. § 18-8304(3), which compels a sex offender to register if he 
has "pled guilty or has been found guilty, notwithstanding the form of the 
judgment or withheld judgment," I.C. § 18-8005(9) subjects defendants to a 
felony enhancement when the defendant "has pled guilty or has been found 
guilty of a felony [DUI] ... , notwithstanding the form of the judgment(s) or 
withheld judgment(s) .. ,," In other words, the only predicate required for the 
enhancement is, under the plain language of I.C. § 18-8005(9), a prior guilty plea 
or finding of guilt. Compare Robinson, supra. 
The Supreme Court's opinion in Sharp does not change this conclusion. 
Indeed, Sharp does not even inform the analysis. In Sharp, the Court considered 
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the following question certified to it by the United States District Court for the 
District of Utah, Northern Division: "Does an outstanding withheld judgment 
based on a guilty plea qualify as a conviction under Idaho law?" 145 Idaho at 
403, 179 P.3d at 1059. The Court held that it did, concluding that a conviction 
"means the establishing of guilt either by a plea of guilty or by a finding of guilt 
following a tria!." Sharp, 145 Idaho at 404, 179 P.3d at 1060. Nowhere in Sharp 
did the Court address the effect of relief under I.C. § 19-2604(1). Indeed, Sharp 
never even sought relief under that statute. 19.:. at 404, 179 P.3d at 1060. As 
such, Sharp has no bearing on the Court's analysis in this case. 
Glenn also contends that Reed should be overruled because, he claims, 
the Court of Appeals in deciding Reed engaged in "unnecessary" "statutory 
interpretation." (Appellant's Brief, p.6.) Although his argument in support of this 
claim is somewhat disjointed, it appears the basis for Glenn's contention in this 
regard is that the Court of Appeals somehow applied incorrect principles of 
statutory interpretation in deciding Reed. (See generally Appellant's Brief, pp.21-
28.) Glenn specifically notes 
the Reed Court stated that its approach to the statute was 'to 
ascertain the legislative intent and give effect to that intent. To 
ascertain the intent of the legislature, not only must the literal words 
of the statute be examined, but also the context of those words, the 
public policy behind the statute and its legislative history .... 
Constructions of a statute that would lead to an absurd result are 
disfavored. 
(Appellant's Brief (quoting Reed at 904, 243 P.3d at 1092).) Glenn complains, 
this "approach has been soundly rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court" in 
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Verska3. (Appellant's Brief, pp.27-28.) Glenn overstates the principle rejected in 
Verska and misrepresents what the Court of Appeals did in Reed. 
In Verska, the Supreme Court disavowed the judiciary's authority to 
interpret an unambiguous statute other than as written on the grounds that giving 
effect to the plain language of the statute would be palpably absurd. 151 Idaho 
at 895, 265 P.3d at 508. The Court reasoned that "[d]oing so would simply 
constitute revising the statute," which it did not have the authority to do. 19.:. 
Just because the Court of Appeals' opinion in Reed recited the legal 
standard later disavowed in Verska does not mean the Court applied it. Indeed, 
as recognized by the Supreme Court in Verska itself, that language "or similar 
language" has been cited in cases "numerous times, usually without even 
addressing whether [the Court] considered the unambiguous statute absurd as 
written." Verska, 151 Idaho at 895,265 P.3d at 508. Nothing in Reed supports 
the assertion that the Court of Appeals ignored the plain language of I.C. § 18-
8005(9) or I.C § 19-2604(1) in order to avoid an "absurd result," which is what 
Verska rejects. 
Moreover, in his effort to convince this Court that the Court of Appeals in 
Reed applied unsound principles of statutory interpretation, Glenn only quotes 
half of the boilerplate language from Reed. The first half of the standards recited 
in Reed encompass what Glenn notes is the proper standard from Verksa 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.27-28): 
3 Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 265 P.3d 
502 (2011). 
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Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, th[e] 
Court must give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in 
statutory construction. The language of the statute is to be given its 
plain, obvious, and rational meaning. If the language is clear and 
unambiguous, there is no occasion for the court to resort to 
legislative history or rules of statutory interpretation. 
Reed, 149 Idaho at 904,243 P.3d at 1092. Glenn, of course, also fails to include 
the modifying language preceding the standards he does quote. the full 
statement by the Court of Appeals is: "When this Court must engage in 
statutory construction, it has the duty to ascertain the legislative intent and give 
effect to that intent." Reed, 149 Idaho at 904,243 P.3d at 1092 (emphasis added 
to reflect language omitted by Glenn). 
Regardless of what can be argued about the language employed by the 
Court of Appeals in Reed, in the end, the Court of Appeals' conclusion was 
correct and consistent with Supreme Court precedent. In short, relief awarded in 
I.C. § 19-2604(1) does not "erase" a conviction for all purposes; because the 
relief afforded therein is created by the legislature, it can be limited by the 
legislature, which is precisely what the legislature has done in providing for the 
felony DUI enhancement in I.C. § 18-8005(9). Glenn's claims that Reed was 
wrongly decided and that district court erred in apply it fail. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment entered 
upon Glenn's conditional guilty plea to felony driving under the influence. 
DATED this 19th day of December, 2012. 
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